Failure of Democracy in Pakistan?

Irshad Ahmad Haqqani


(* The writer is one of the most widely read columnists in Pakistan. He served as Federal Minister of Information and Media Development during the interim government of Malik Meraj Khalid from November 1996 to February 1997.)






In order to understand the plight of democracy in Pakistan, one needs to remember the circumstances into which Pakistan came into being. Its establishment as an independent country was the result of a political movement of Muslims of the Subcontinent, no doubt, but those Muslims were not politically organized. In fact, they had no political platform during the initial period. Though they acquired one in 1906 in the form of the Muslim League, this group was not terribly effective until 1934, when Jinnah joined it. Most of those who assumed leadership in the Muslim League and rose to power later in the newly independent country neither felt any real attachment to the norms of democracy nor showed any genuine commitment to Islamic teachings. The persistence of feudal culture throughout the country after independence (even to today) also helped nondemocratic forces exert their influence and poses a continuing and formidable challenge to the progress of democracy in Pakistan.
In addition to this internal dimension, the country faces enormous security pressures due to multifaceted problems with India. As State survival became the country's primary concern, the military assumed a greater than average importance. Then, in the wake of weak political leadership, the military's top brass began to assert its centrality in matters of governance and political management. One reason for the military's frequent and prolonged stints in power is that military rulers have managed to secure substantial external backing for themselves.
Unfortunately, Pakistani politicians have not utilized the interludes between periods of military rule to establish a civilian government. Instead, those who prospered "at the pleasure" of military dictators allowed Parliament to simply "rubber-stamp" the military's initiatives. Rather than serving the cause of democracy, Pakistani politicians have chosen instead to curry favor from the military's top brass and its backers in Washington. By indulging in corruption, these politicians have not only smeared their own reputations but have also given rise to increasing public disenchantment with politics and the political process.
The state of the judiciary is as dismal as that of other branches of the Pakistani government. Apart from a few bold judgments, the higher courts have played a pliant role to suit the whims and notions of those in power. Military dictators and civilians too required that the courts comply with their demands.
The country's media, however, holds promise both for itself and for the nation. In the face of restrictions and persecution, it has managed to survive and uphold the cause of freedom of expression.
In spite of the many obstacles and failures in the democratic process, the people of Pakistan have again and again shown confidence in democracy. Given the opportunity, the public has risen against the military's intervention in politics and forced them back to their barracks. The people want to see Pakistan emerge as a democratic, law-abiding country. Pakistanis have as much potential to live in a peaceful democracy as people of any other nation, and this road it must take. Developing democracy, however, requires time, which it must be given without interruption.
Another phase of local elections recently concluded,1 giving rise to both expectations and apprehensions. While the President, Prime Minister and spokespersons of the ruling coalition declared that these elections were an important milestone in the history of democracy in Pakistan, the opposition expressed serious concerns about the exercise. Though the rulers thought it prudent to hold these elections on a non-party basis, political parties of all hues — ruling and opposition — participated with full vigor.
With all the contradictory assertions and allegations, one faces the inevitable question: Is Pakistan on the road to democracy? If so, then why hasn't it taken root in the country?
While there may be more than one answer and perspective, it is important to keep in mind how Pakistan came into being. Did the conditions that are a pre-requisite for the growth of democratic culture exist or not?






Muslims in the Subcontinent









After being in power in the Subcontinent for over 800 years, Muslims found themselves on the wrong side of the political equation when British colonial forces overthrew them and assumed direct power in the middle of the nineteenth century. The new rulers subjugated their predecessors and deliberately kept them backward in all areas. Although Hindus too were the subjects of colonial rule, they had not been overthrown by their new masters and so were not as averse to them, or their views and policies, as were the Muslims. Indignant at having been removed from power and proud of their values, Muslims boycotted everything English. They were averse to modern education and even against the learning of the English language. Hindus, on the other hand, took to the modern approach more easily. Thus, Muslims began lagging behind their Hindu fellows, who outnumbered them in all fields of human activity.
Since the failure of the Mutiny of 1857, Muslims have also been suspected of being "disloyal." They lacked a political platform of their own from which to express their views. Sir Syed Ahmad Khan (d. 1898) had only relative success convincing colonial rulers of the reasons for Muslim unrest and persuading Muslims to desist from active politics and focus instead on acquiring modern educations. He advised Muslims against joining the Indian National Congress (formed in 1885), which was ostensibly a neutral platform for "interaction" between the English and their subjects, but a clear bias toward the Hindu population was evident from the day of its inception.2
Congress struggled to achieve self-rule and independence, but in a way that not only left Muslims hopeless about their status and rights in a free and united India but also made them suspicious about the party's intentions due to its position on issues vital to Muslims, such as separate electorates, the partition of Bengal, and Muslim leaders' efforts for Hindu-Muslim unity. This led to the creation of the Muslim League in 1906 as a party that aimed specifically to represent Muslims.






The Birth and Rise of the Muslim League






The Muslim League would not become a party representing the masses and espousing modern political thought and trends for over a quarter century. It was only when Jinnah joined in 1934 that it began to function as intended. With a solid understanding of the existing situation in the Subcontinent and grasping global trends of liberation and the right of self-determination of all peoples, Jinnah both defined the distinct nature of the Muslim identity and called for a separate homeland for them where they could live according to their own values and way of life.
Pitted in a political battle, Congress and the Muslim League held positions that were becoming increasingly irreconcilable. To resolve the impasse, Lord Wavell, then Viceroy of India, convened a conference at Simla in June 1945 at which it was decided that elections would be held to ascertain who represents whom, and to what extent. Earlier, in the elections in 1937 held under the India Act of 1935, the Muslim League had been unable to prove that it was the sole representative of India's Muslim population while Congress had succeeded in forming its governments in six provinces under the eye of its central leadership.





Early Political Exigencies








Preparing for the 1945–46 elections, Jinnah welcomed "everybody who was anybody" in politics into the Muslim League, but particularly people from the Muslim-majority provinces. Needless to say, he had to compromise in one way or another to enlist Muslim support for the party. The Jinnah-Sikandar Pact is one example of his approach in this regard. On the other hand, local influentials and vested interests in the Muslim-majority areas who wanted only to secure their stake in any future setup were now eager to join the Muslim League, since its ranks were swelling and fortunes rising under Jinnah's dynamic leadership. Many of those who joined the League at this stage did not have any real connection with democratic values and norms. Unfortunately, the undemocratic elements are still at the helm of affairs in the party.
The two parties that assumed power in August 1947 in the two newly independent states of Pakistan and India were poles apart in terms of their political growth, democratic culture, political acumen, and the character of their leadership. Leadership of the Congress espoused democratic values, a nationalist sentiment, and secularism, but many of those who assumed leadership in the Muslim League neither felt any real attachment to the norms of democracy nor showed any commitment to Islamic teachings.
While Nehru's contribution in promoting a democratic culture after Independence in India cannot be denied, the fact is that it was not just Nehru but almost all congressional leaders and supporters who upheld the notion of democracy. With or without Nehru, democracy was set to take root in India. In sharp contrast, those who came to rule in Pakistan were not particularly open to democracy; they believed in personal cults and group interests, not in political institutions or systems. They could not really fathom the idea that common people can be the final arbiters of their own destinies.







Non-democratic Practices and Consequences






It was because the democratic mind-set was so alien to Pakistanis that it took nine years for the country to have a constitution of its own, whereas India achieved this end in just one year. It was not a coincidence that the tradition of time-bound elections took root in India from the very beginning, whereas it took 23 years for Pakistan to hold its first country-wide election — which, ironically, resulted in the bifurcation of the country into Pakistan and Bangladesh. In large part, the secessionist strain in Bangladesh (then the East Pakistan province) was encouraged by the non-democratic attitude of political leaders from West Pakistan. These politicians refused to accept the majority and its right to rule, and instead tried to impose their writ by force, inadvertently paving the way for the separation of the entire region.
These politicians had exhibited similar behavior earlier. In the 1951 elections in Punjab and the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), the sanctity of the ballot box was sacrificed for the sake of political interests and coming to power by any means. In the 1954 elections in East Pakistan, the Jagtu (United) Front won an overwhelming majority, but its government was sacked within a few months and governor rule imposed.
It is an unfortunate reality that those who came to rule the country from the outset were not particularly fond of or trained in democratic traditions. Jinnah only lived for about a year after the creation of Pakistan. His towering persona had overshadowed the weaknesses of local politicians and the fledgling system, but these were exposed with his passing.





Feudal Culture





The existence of a feudal-like system in Pakistan continues to present a formidable obstacle to the progress of democracy in the country. In India, feudalism and landlordism were brought to an end soon after Independence. This ended the poor's financial dependence on feudal lords. The lower classes tasted new freedoms, which in turn supported the spread of democracy in the country. The situation in Pakistan was quite the opposite. Much of the Muslim League leadership, especially from the areas that subsequently became part of Pakistan, was composed of wealthy and powerful landlords and feudal and tribal leaders. Their interests lay in maintaining the status quo; they neither had any particular affinity for democratic values nor did they care about improving the lot of the masses. Since local feudals and chieftains control government machinery, in rural areas in particular, law enforcement agencies take more interest in enforcing the writ of the feudal than that of the law. The feudal class not only still exists but has gained in strength and influence in Pakistani politics. Many of those who occupy prominent positions in political parties, ruling and opposition alike, belong to this class, and their interests lie in the perpetuation of the present feudalistic system.
It is an unfortunate fact that feudal and tribal chiefs have frustrated efforts toward improvement in the area of education. They even opposed the development of infrastructure for fear that this would lead to people's emancipation and progress — the same people who had hitherto been their hapless subjects. The incidence of violence and crime against women in rural areas is a part of this larger picture. Though not limited to women, a particularly ugly fact is that they are often humiliated as a means of subjugating and suppressing the men in the feudal's dominion.
Politics has become a game for the rich and this is a result of the power and influence that feudals enjoy in the country. It is almost impossible for a middle-class individual to consider standing in elections. Thus has the feudal system impeded the growth of democracy in Pakistan.






Military Intervention






With a weak democratic culture and group of politicians (in addition to Indian hostility against Pakistan), the military's top brass found an excuse to meddle in national political affairs. The military has ruled the country for more than half of Pakistan's existence. Even when it is not ruling, military leaders call the shots from behind the scenes and play a "guardian role" in the affairs of the government.
Military interference in Pakistani politics began in the early 1950s when Army Chief General Ayub Khan helped the President dislodge weak political leaders one after another and ultimately assumed power himself by imposing martial law in 1958. The seeds for this had been sown when Khan was appointed Defense Minister "in uniform" in 1954.3
The military's involvement in politics is a major reason why a democratic political culture has not developed in Pakistan. Weak political leadership, India's hostility toward Pakistan and the lingering problem in Jammu and Kashmir have necessitated that Pakistan maintain a large and powerful army.






External Support for Military Juntas





America's patronage of Pakistan's military rulers has also contributed to the inability of democracy to take root in the country. In the face of Indian hostility, Pakistan thought it could best meet security needs by forming an alliance with America and participating in U.S.-led Western treaties (SEATO and CENTO) in the 1950s. Despite all its talk of democracy, the U.S. thinks its own interests are better served when the military has a very prominent role in Pakistan's national matters. This is because the U.S. finds it easy to deal with an unelected dictator — a single person surrounded by sycophants — rather than an elected political leadership that represents the whole nation. The history of external powers' interest and intervention in Pakistan's internal matters is long and sad. If we ignore it, we do so at our peril; the way to overcome it is through the political process.
The U.S. patronized General Ayub Khan so that it would have an ally in the region. It wanted to check the spread of communism, of which Soviet Russia and China were the two main protagonists. Also, India was leaning toward cooperation with the Soviets. The U.S. fully backed General Zia-ul-Haq with respect to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and Pakistan's support to the Afghan resistance. This is the U.S. strategy even today. Declaring its attack on Afghanistan in October 2001 as a "war against terrorism," the U.S. enlisted General Pervez Musharraf's support as a "close ally" in this war. Before this, the General did not enjoy favor from the U.S. The perception in Pakistan is that as long as the U.S. needs the General, it will continue to support him regardless of how that affects democracy in Pakistan.
While the U.S. has supported Pakistan's military dictators, successive civilian rulers were never in favor. For example, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, in spite of his secularist thinking, was not in America's good graces because he started a nuclear program. Then there were the crushing sanctions the U.S. imposed against Pakistan throughout the period of civilian rule from the late 1980s to the late 90s — a whole decade — when Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif were the elected leaders of the country.
Pakistan first faced martial law in 1958. Although military ruler Ayub Khan employed all means to create an impression of mass support for his rule, he failed to provide justification for being in office and had to relinquish power in the face of the massive agitation and political antagonism against him. His was a despotic rule; the constitution he devised was aimed to perpetuate his own power. He introduced EBDO (Elective Bodies Disqualification Ordinance), a presidential system and maneuvered to defeat Jinnah's sister (Fatima Jinnah) — and with this the will of the people in the presidential elections of 1965. In spite of all this, he had to abdicate power in 1968. What is worth noting is that the subsequent transfer of power did not take place according to the constitution he had devised. It is unfortunate that his departure did not result in democracy in Pakistan. He was succeeded by another despot, General Yahya Khan, who presided over the tragic separation of East Pakistan — reaping what Ayub Khan had sown there for himself.






Political Bickering






The chaotic reign of General Yahya Khan ended when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto assumed power. Although he was an elected Prime Minister, he held the dubious distinction of being the Civilian Chief Martial Law Administrator. He had been Foreign Minister with Ayub Khan, and had made the post a focus of public attention. His charismatic leadership and role in foreign and defense policies aside, Bhutto did not show any real interest in promoting a democratic culture in Pakistan either. Although his role in the consensual 1973 Constitution has been greatly appreciated, he himself trampled its sanctity. He not only persecuted his political opponents but refused to tolerate dissent, even from within party ranks.
Thus, in spite of civilian rule from 1972 to 77, democracy failed to take hold in Pakistan. The constitution was not respected in either spirit or letter. Smaller provinces were restless and complained about the federal government's attitude. The situation came to a head in the province of Balochistan — army action was mounted there. This might have quelled the opposition at the time, but further boosted anti-Center sentiment. Ultimately, the provincial governments in Balochistan and NWFP were dissolved (The Balochistan government was dissolved, while the NWFP government resigned in protest).4
The performance of the opposition from the platform of the Pakistan National Alliance (PNA) too became a cause for despondency and dejection. The allegation against the leadership of the Alliance is that it deliberately tried to sabotage talks with the government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, that it invited martial law (1977) and obtained ministerial positions separately after differences developed among its own ranks. The formation of MRD led by the Pakistan People's Party (PPP) could not provide a platform for political culture. Along with those in its ranks who were playing the game of the establishment, the MRD was criticized by those who had earlier formed the PNA against the PPP. This mutual recrimination adversely affected the position of all political parties in the eyes of the people.
Although apparently facing no political challenge but in search of legitimacy for his rule and to continue as president, General Zia-ul-Haq held elections in 1985 on a non-party basis — like the recently concluded elections for local bodies. While these elections paved the way for democracy, they also strengthened the biraderi system and gave rise to parochial, ethnic and tribal prejudices. The tenure of Prime Minister Junejo (1985–88) proved better in many respects than the previous governments. Martial law came to an end — although the 8th Amendment provided indemnity for measures taken by the martial law regime, political parties were revived, and there were greater freedoms of speech and dissent. But when the Premier began to assert himself, the President (General Zia-ul-Haq, who was also the Chief of Army) dismissed him.
This relatively better period of civilian rule in Pakistan was followed by a game of musical chairs between two other civilian leaders — Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif. Between 1988 and 1999, both assumed power in two stints each, interspersed with caretaker governments. Neither showed any interest in promoting democracy in the country and instead indulged in personal aggrandizement and cronyism. It is sad that both failed to show any real commitment to democracy. This provided another excuse for the military to call the shots from behind the scene for about a decade and then jump directly into the foray and reassume power.5
The people of Pakistan feel a kind of disillusionment with democracy and its suitability for governing and running the affairs of their state. A number of questions such as, Should we imitate the Western model of democracy or have a vision of our own? have been raised to create confusion. What Pakistan needs is not to question the system but to start with a system and continue with it. In modern times, no system has proved better than democracy.
It is clear that democracy in Pakistan will be different from the Western model. Here, the legislature will never have unlimited power to legislate on any issue, as the legislatures in Western democracies have; they will be guided by Islamic teachings. Here, sovereignty will be recognized as Allah's and people will enjoy power as His vicegerents. In Muslim democracies, the legislature cannot declare halal what has been declared haram, and vice versa. But in remaining matters — such as adult franchise; time-bound elections; political freedoms; separate jurisdiction of the Parliament, Judiciary, and the Executive branches of state; human rights; etc. — there is nothing inherent in democracy that conflicts with the message of Islam. The demands of Islamic teachings and tenets have been enshrined in every constitution Pakistan has ever had. This is why it is regarded as a sacred document. It is a covenant between the different segments and classes of society. A civilized nation respects and obeys its constitution in all situations. This enables it to face the ups and downs of circumstance and continue with its collective national life. This ability, in turn, provides confidence and a sense of security as well as highlighting its distinct identity among other nations. Pakistan needs these things and therefore needs to take democracy seriously.
Sovereign nations achieve stability, strength and power not because of a few individuals but because of strong institutions, stable systems, and well-rooted traditions. This is a process of evolution. It may be that the political process and democracy in Pakistan have failed again and again and that they cannot bring stability to the country. However, the answer is not in giving up on the democratic process, but in adhering to it more closely.
Democratic institutions and tradition take root only through a process of evolution. The sapling of democracy may take root quickly in one place if conditions allow, but it must be given time to grow, even if it appears to be taking too long. From the very start, the situation in Pakistan has not been favorable for the evolution of democracy. The country faced crises on both internal and external fronts. Internally, it was weak and faced a host of issues; externally it faced the hostility of its much larger neighbor. But this is no excuse for military intervention in politics. Observant people agree that if the army had resisted the urge to jump into the foray in 1958, there would have been no subsequent periods of martial law because Pakistani political institutions would have gained in strength and maturity, assumed their proper role and averted the conditions under which the military intervened in national affairs. Since democracy was effectively killed in its infancy, the later stages of maturity and experience could not be reached.
This is how we should view the flaws and weaknesses of political leadership even now. Maturity will come with the passage of time, as will political stability and economic prosperity. Traditions need time to take root, but they will. Pakistan is not a special case in that cannot be trusted and will therefore be barred from evolving. In a free environment, we can express our values and reflect these in our institutions. But we must realize there is no escaping some degree of trial and error.
As far as the people of the country are concerned, they have shown their confidence in the democratic tradition time and again. When General Yahya lifted the ban from political activities in January 1970, the whole country saw a great enthusiasm and increased political activism — even though it had been in the throes of chaos for five months in the preceding year. The year-long political electoral campaign remained peaceful. Similarly, the electioneering of 1977 saw great tension and agitation, yet elections were peaceful, as was the PNA-led campaign against alleged electoral rigging. It was similar in the 2002 elections. This shows that Pakistanis are a normal political people and can go as far on the road to democracy as any other nation can. This road we must take; we cannot do without it.





Role of the Judiciary




A major factor for the frequent interruptions in the democratic process is the tendency of military governments to devise new constitutions and then abrogation them. Those politicians who prosper under the military's umbrella do not consider the exercise of constitution-making more than a game and play to serve vested interests while adjusting to the mood of the "high command." This is one reason why the constitution in Pakistan has not achieved the sanctity that is its due, and which is accorded to it in civilized societies.
With this approach, those who happen to rule the country see no reason for concern over the uncertain and unclear status of the Constitution of 1973 these days. To them, the country is functioning quite well despite all this fuss and mess. Even if the constitution is abrogated or changed tomorrow, they hold, there would be no catastrophe. Observant people cannot help showing concern over such an attitude. A country's constitution reflects its political philosophy, its way of life, and its views on governance. It is, in fact, an agreement between the different classes and segments of society, regions, and administrative units. All segments of society look to it to arrive at decisions with consensus.
In this regard, the role of the judiciary is very important. The judiciary, needless to say, plays a vital role in the promotion and consolidation of democracy in any country. But it has not been given the freedom that it needs to play its due role in Pakistan.
If the judiciary is to play its due role in the promotion of democracy in the country, then its credibility must be restored. The government's power to appoint judges should be eliminated; it should be the Supreme Judicial Council that reviews the cases of judges' appointment and promotion and then refers them to the Prime Minister and President for action. The judiciary's autonomy in economic matters is important so that it can dispense justice among the people and the government, between the Center and the Provinces, and among the Provinces themselves. Judges' tenures should be secure so that they can function without insecurity, fear or outside influence. There should be restrictions preventing judges' appointment to a profitable post after retirement. The government should desist from any overture that gives the impression, no matter how slight, that it seeks to influence or direct the Pakistan's courts.
Until the government does this and the people see and believe that this it is so, the dream of rule of law and the prevalence of justice will remain elusive.
The absence of a democratic culture and tradition of rule of law are Pakistan's biggest problems. If we do not address these issues directly, the state of Pakistan will continue to suffer. The need of the hour is to establish a rule of law that applies to all, the rulers and the ruled, and that includes a prohibition against military intervention.




The Present




Despite the people's commitment and the role the media has and is playing, it is sad that the present political scenario is no better than the past. There exists in Pakistan only the appearance of democracy; the country has a long way to go to actually be a democracy.
President General Pervez Musharraf has repeatedly said that democracy has taken root in Pakistan. He points to the freedom the press enjoys, the existence of a functioning Parliament, and the accountability of officials, along with the enhanced role of women in national politics. He has also remarked that it might seem strange that he, being a person in uniform, talks about democracy and insists he has established a lasting system of democracy, but he claims he has and that to do so is his Providence-ordained task.6
No matter what Musharraf says, the people of Pakistan can see that an Army Chief has become their ruler, that he is equipped with vast powers under the 8th and 17th Amendments7 to the Constitution, that he created a majority by cobbling together different elements in the aftermath of the 2002 elections, and that whoever might be occupying the seat of the Prime Minister — Mir Zafarullah Jamali, Chaudhri Shujaat Hussain, or Mr. Shaukat Aziz — he is the one who makes that appointment. These Prime Ministers apparently assumed their offices with the Parliament's majority's vote, but there is no illusion as to who enjoys the real power. As for the degree of freedom of the press, this is neither a sudden occurrence nor a gift from anyone. It is the press itself that has protected its freedom and secured its place for itself.
General Musharraf's assertions are not new. What is more important, however, is that while he reiterated them in New York (September 2005) during his recent visit, and said that a President should not be in uniform, he declined to give assurance that he would give up his uniform in 2007. When pressed, he said that he would "cross the bridge on reaching it." This is what he used to say when asked whether he would give up his uniform by December 31, 2004 (according to an agreement with the MMA in the form of the 17th Amendment). The bridge was there and the whole world saw how he crossed it! His statement that "no U.S. official, including President Bush, asked him to doff his uniform" indicates that the chances he will remove his uniform are slim, even in 2007. Musharraf counts the recently concluded local bodies elections as an indication that democracy is well on its course in the country. Such assertions, in spite of all the allegations against the transparency of these elections, suggest that the same drama will be repeated in the next general elections.





THE FUTURE




What is the future of democracy in Pakistan? In his recent book, Stephen P. Cohen talks about possible scenarios for Pakistan in the future. In the first, "Continuation of Establishment-dominated oligarchic system," he says: "Over the next five or six years: do not underestimate the capability of a small elite to manage a big country, but do not exaggerate their ability to work together and avert disaster." In his words, the outcome of such a scenario is: "Pakistan manipulates terrorist threat, Establishment searches for external alliances, nuclear and missile production continues despite weak economy, little movement in relations with India." In the second scenario, even if a political and democratic government is restored, it would remain weak and the military would continue to call the shots from behind the scenes.
The prospects for true democracy in Pakistan are apparently not very bright. The absence of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif has weakened their political parties. It is almost certain that the circle around these parties will be narrowed further before the next election, which may force the parties to boycott them. The government will also not allow the MMA (a political alliance of six religious parties) to benefit in any way from the vacuum. All this implies that the

Q-League (the ruling faction of the Muslim League) will be in a position to dominate the next Parliament as well.

The country is in danger of moving towards one-party rule under the umbrella of General Musharraf, who will secure for himself the right to continue in office with his uniform and even maneuver his unopposed election, and who will be content with his rule and its continuation at the cost of weakening all political forces in Pakistan except the Q-League and its allies.
The politically conscious people of Pakistan, however, cannot accept that Pakistan needs a democratic model in which the Army Chief becomes President, with a central and key role in the system and full concentration of powers in his hands, and in which notable political figures have been kept out and disallowed to play their due role.
If General Musharraf remains adamant about running a democracy under his thumb, and if his political allies continue to be opportunistic, wanting to see him President at the time of general elections in 2007, then forces in the opposition may wind up in a boycott of elections. Will this benefit the country? Obviously not.
The key to preventing political tension lies with General Musharraf himself. The first thing to do in this regard is to assure the people that the next elections will really be free and fair, and to encourage people to forget the past. A good start would be by appointing the next Chief Election Commissioner with the opposition's consent. Then, Benazir and Nawaz Sharif should be allowed to return and lead their party during elections. Political space should be provided to all political actors without prejudice and manipulation.
The people of Pakistan and their leaders need to believe that 'controlled' or 'compromised' democracy is not Pakistan's destiny; its progress lies in adherence to democracy with its well-established and very well-known norms. Although the military has come to occupy an important position in the political setup, acquiescing to it as "an immutable reality" and, then, compromising on principled positions does not behoove true democrats.
Endnotes Go to sectionTop of pageMuslims in the SubcontinentThe Birth and Rise of the Musl...Early Political ExigenciesNon-democratic Practices and C...Feudal CultureMilitary InterventionExternal Support for Military ...Political BickeringRole of the JudiciaryThe PresentThe Future?EndnotesUsers who read this article al...



Footnotes


* The writer is one of the most widely read columnists in Pakistan. He served as Federal Minister of Information and Media Development during the interim government of Malik Meraj Khalid from November 1996 to February 1997.


1. Elections for district governments in Pakistan were held in three phases; began in August and concluded in October 2005.


2. Congress claimed to represent all communities in India: Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Parsis,
Christians, etc. No doubt, prominent Muslim figures such as Badruddin Tyabji and Maulana Azad became its Presidents, but they remained mere figure-heads–Goakhale, Tilak, Gandhi, and Nehru were the men who really pulled the reins, directly or from the behind the scenes.


3. In order to secure a greater role in national affairs and legitimize it, the military has sought some kind of constitutional arrangement for its role in politics. General Zia was the first military ruler who proposed setting up of a National Security Council (NSC) for the top brass to share policy-making with civilian political leaders. He added Article 152-A to the 1973 Constitution through the Revival of Constitutional Order (RCO) in March 1985 to establish the NSC. The formation of NSC was opposed by most political circles and had to be dropped as part of the deal with the Parliament to get its approval for the revised version of RCO as the Eighth Constitutional Amendment in October 1985. Then, in his address at the Navy War College in October 1998, Army Chief General Jehangir Karamat underlined the need for creating an institutional arrangement at the highest level for devising effective policies for coping with ongoing economic drift and political management problems. Five days after his assumption of power, Army Chief General Pervez Musharraf announced formation of an NSC headed by the Chief Executive (the title he chose for himself). In December 2003, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) and the government signed an agreement for resolving the political impasse on the Legal Framework Order (LFO). One of the provisions of this agreement provided that the NSC would not be a constitutional body but would be set up through legislation. Other opposition parties stayed away from this agreement, which took the form of the 17th Amendment.


4. In addition, the government's ill-devised policies in the economic field created anxiety, unrest and instability. The policy of nationalization of industrial and educational institutions, for example, gave rise to widespread apprehensions that the government's continuation in office would result in increasing government control and squeeze the space for private business. The nationalization policy produced the worst situation of high inflation rate and declining purchasing-power. Inadvertently, the rulers not only invited public rage against themselves, but, to an extent, created a sort of disillusionment with democracy for they were democratically elected rulers!


5. Benazir Bhutto and her spouse have allegedly been involved in corruption on a massive scale, but the way the Accountability Bureau targeted them during the Nawaz era did not give to the common man the impression that the process of accountability was neutral or judicious. The process of 'victimization' against Benazir Bhutto has become so long and the moral and legal foundations on which it is based are so weak that, in spite of all the allegations against them, the former ruling couple has started winning sympathies in some hearts. The nation had risen in 1996–97 for establishing the tradition of judicious accountability, but the Nawaz government failed to give it a proper shape. This was a great disservice to the nation. If a neutral and credible machinery had been established for the purpose of accountability, this would have strengthened the notion of rule of law along with considerably reducing the level of corruption.


6. The claim of establishing a democratic setup according to Pakistan's peculiar ground realities is not new. General Musharraf is not the first to say so. General Ayub had similarly talked about basic democracy, controlled democracy and the system that better reflects the needs of the nation, etc. His system was a house of cards that vanished with his own removal from the scene. General Yahya too tried to give a so-called democratic constitution that actually revolved around his person. Zia-ul-Haq used at times Islam and at others made reference to a diary of Quaid-e-Azam to flout well-established democratic principles and continue with his Martial Law. When he had to hold elections in 1985, he held them on a non-party basis to keep the political parties out.


7. These Amendments are like a bargain in which measures taken during the Martial Law tenures were given indemnity in exchange for bringing an end to Martial Law rule. The 8th Amendment was passed in 1985 to lift Zia's Martial Law, while the 17th Amendment was passed in 2003, after an agreement between the government and the MMA (United Action Front), to fix a date for General Musharraf to give up his army post (in fact, either of the two offices he held: the President and the Army Chief) and pave way for real parliamentary democracy.